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Abstract 
System of Systems (SoS) can be represented by the SoS architecture which defines the constituent systems and their interfaces. 
SoS delivers capabilities beyond what the systems working independently can provide. Resiliency of the SoS is becoming 
increasingly more important and necessary for mission success. Resiliency can be defined as the ability of the SoS architecture to 
defend against emerging threats. This defense means adapting the SoS architecture to handle the new threat. As a new threat is 
uncovered, the SoS architecture evolves to a new SoS architecture resilient to the new threat. This paper presents a novel approach
to modeling SoS resilience using the SoS architecture as represented in Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 
views. DoDAF views are required for US DoD programs and are a way of common communication among stakeholders. This 
modeling approach uses an executable agent-based model of the SoS that includes the SoS architecture and possible threats. The 
initial SoS architecture is taken from the appropriate DoDAF views. The modeling approach introduces a threat and then adapts 
the SoS architecture to handle the threat. In this way, resiliency is increased. Finally, the DoDAF views are updated to reflect the 
newly adapted SoS architecture. 
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1. Introduction 
Previous papers have elaborated the idea of modeling System of Systems (SoS) development using model-based 
systems engineering (MBSE) and agent-based modeling1,2. This paper describes a novel approach to modeling 
resiliency in SoS architectures that is referred to as the SoS architecture resiliency model (SARM).  
The SARM uses information on systems and capabilities from Department of Defense (DoD) Architecture 
Framework (DoDAF) viewpoints as the basis for the initial SoS architecture. From the initial SoS architecture, the 
SARM models the SoS development process requesting capabilities from the individual systems. During the SoS 
development process, emerging threats can affect the capabilities provided by the SoS. The SARM models resilience 
by a SoS architecture that adapts to handle the threat.  
In the SARM, resilience is defined as the ability of the SoS development to adapt and account for emerging threats 
while maintaining SoS capabilities. The SoS architecture identifies which systems and interfaces are part of the SoS 
to deliver those SoS capabilities. In this way, resilience must be a characteristic of the SoS architecture in order that 
the SoS be resilient. 
2. Background 
There are different definitions for SoS. In one case, SoS is defined as “a set or arrangement of systems that results 
when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities3.” Another 
definition requires the constituent systems to be operationally and managerially independent4. The latter definition 
illustrates the complexity of managing a SoS. Earlier papers1,2, provided the mechanism for representing the 
independence of the constituent systems using an ABM1,2. The earlier papers started with an initial architecture that 
could be specified by the SoS manager or could be the best fit architecture using a genetic algorithm.  
Consider that the SoS can be specified via a SoS architecture. The SoS architecture defines the constituent systems 
and their relationships. The constituent systems with their relationships determine the capabilities at the SoS level. A 
SoS provides capabilities that are not possible by any one system operating in isolation. SoS development involves 
acquiring and synchronizing system level capabilities from the constituent systems that together provide a higher level 
SoS capability. An earlier paper described the SoS development process in mathematical terms and represented the 
SoS architecture as a chromosome2. Those mathematical terms were used to model SoS development using an agent-
based model1. This ABM1 took into account the negotiation between the SoS manager and the constituent systems. 
The chromosome representation of the SoS architecture2 makes it possible to use a genetic algorithm on the SoS 
architecture to find the best fit architecture. But the chromosome representation is not the best mechanism for 
communicating the SoS architecture.  
The DoD requires the use of the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) in development of DoD architectures. 
Since some programs already use DoDAF viewpoints to describe their architectures, it made sense to consider how 
the DoDAF viewpoints might be used to feed into the ABM previously developed. For this reason, the SoS architecture 
was described using DoDAF viewpoints and the SARM was developed to incorporate the DoDAF viewpoints with 
the ABM.  
With the advent of cyber-attacks, the importance of resilient systems has become paramount. Events such as the 
widely published Target store breach that affected 110 million customers, has elevated the importance of systems that 
are resilient. Resiliency recently became an important aspect of SoS design, as well. In the earlier papers1,2, the concept 
of a threat was considered as part of the environment with limited scope and limited effect on the SoS development. 
In order to provide a more meaningful model of the SoS development that more accurately represents the real world 
development, an additional agent was added to the model that represents the emerging threat from cyber-attacks. The 
SoS development is now focused on adapting to the emerging threat by adjusting the SoS architecture to account for 
the threat.  
Recently, the DoD acquisition process has shifted to focus on capabilities in the very early acquisition cycle5. This 
emphasis on capabilities in the early acquisition cycle also includes development of SoS. The capabilities being 
defined at the higher SoS level and then mapped down to the lower level constituent systems. Resiliency now being 
important at the higher level capabilities6. As the DoD tries to take advantage of existing legacy systems along with 
more modern systems, there is increased emphasis on SoS capabilities. These are capabilities that are not present at 
113 Paulette Acheson and Cihan Dagli /  Procedia Computer Science  95 ( 2016 )  111 – 118 
the system level but are only present when constituent systems cooperate with the SoS manager to provide the higher 
level capabilities. The recent emphasis on higher level capabilities paired with the need for resiliency has been the 
impetus for the approach to modeling resiliency in SoS architectures described in the following section.  
3. Resilience
Webster’s dictionary defines resilience as “an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change9.” 
Resilience has been recently researched in many different areas including ecosystems, psychology, enterprise, and 
engineering10. One way to approach resilience is to consider the amount of disturbance that a system can absorb before 
it moves away from an equilibrium state to another state11. Thus, a non-resilient system would be one that cannot 
absorb any catastrophic event and maintain the same capabilities. Jackson defines resilience as a combination of 
avoidance, survival, and recovery and considers brittleness to be the opposite of resilient12. Jackson also defines 
capacity as the ability of a system to absorb a disruption without loss of capability12. Resilience capacity index (RCI) 
is a term used to describe the ability of a geographical region to handle changes13.  RCI is used to compare different 
metropolitan regions’ ability to handle disruptions13. In the same way, resilience capacity can be applied to SoS 
architectures.
What makes a system resilient? According to Jackson, the system architecture makes the system resilient12.  Within 
the DoD and DoD organizations there is increased awareness of the need for resilience in systems and in SoS. General 
Hyten expressed the need for resilience and resilient architectures in multiple speeches6,14. This paper builds on the 
increased interest in resilient architectures and presents an approach to modeling resilience in SoS architectures.  
4. Approach  
This paper describes an approach to modeling SoS architectures with consideration for resiliency in the presence 
of emergent threats. The first consideration in SoS development is to define which capabilities are required. This 
aligns with the DoD acquisition process which places capability assessment at the beginning of the acquisition cycle3.
4.1. Capabilities 
A capability is an ability to achieve a desired effect8. Capabilities can be described using the Capability Viewpoint8
and capability views are required for many DoD programs. SoS development also utilizes the capability views to 
describe the SoS capabilities. In the SARM approach the capabilities are first defined using the DoDAF capability 
views. Specifically, the CV-2 capability taxonomy. A typical CV-2 is shown in Figure 1.  
SoS Capability represents the top level tier 1 capability. The top level SoS capability is decomposed into lower 
level more detailed capabilities that can be mapped to systems. The level of capability decomposition depends on the 
SoS being developed and the amount of detail necessary to map to a system. The CV-2 capability taxonomy is 
developed and maintained in an architecture modeling tool, such as Sparx Enterprise Architect7. While the use of an 
architecture modeling tool is not necessary, it does facilitate incorporating the capabilities into the ABM. Fortuitously, 
since most programs are required to produce a capability viewpoint, it makes use of something that already exists. 
Figure 2 shows an example CV-2 Capability Taxonomy for an Unmanned Vehicle.  
Once the capabilities are decomposed, the set of systems must be defined and mapped to those capabilities. The 
mapping of the capabilities to systems is defined in an SV-5b architecture view. Figure 3 shows a typical SV-5b.  
According to DoDAF version 2.028, the SV-5b can map systems back to capabilities or to operational activities. 
Some programs that use the SV-5b to map capabilities to operational activities can also use the CV-6 to indirectly 
trace the capabilities to the systems. Maintaining these DoDAF views in an architecture modeling tool greatly 
facilitates the mapping from capabilities to systems. This is due to the underlying database found in most of these 
modeling tools which allows a query of that underlying database to create an artifact that is the cross reference of 
capabilities to systems. That artifact becomes the input to the ABM.  
One last piece of information that is needed are the system-to-system interfaces. The SV-1 can be used to describe 
the interfaces between the systems. Figure 4 shows an example of an SV-1. Typically the system-to-system interfaces 
are much more extensive than the example given in Figure 4. The system interfaces can in fact span multiple SV-1 
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views. But the point is that the SV-1 view(s) can be used to provide all the system interfaces that are input into the 
ABM. The ABM will use the SV-1 view(s) to create the SoS architecture.  
Once the SoS capabilities, systems, and interfaces have been defined in the DoDAF views, the capabilities, systems, 
and interfaces are extracted from the architecture modeling tool and input into the ABM. Again this process is 
expedited if an architecture modeling tool is used but can still be done manually if the DoDAF viewpoints are 
developed in power point.  
Figure 1. CV-2 Capability Taxonomy 
4.2. Agent-Based Model 
The ABM is an extension of the one developed and described in previous papers1,2. The ABM consists of three 
agents: SoS manager, System, and Threat. In an agent-based model an agent is an abstract type which is instantiated 
to represent an actual element. An abstract type is just an idea that does not physically exist and does not take up any 
memory. The instantiation of the abstract type creates an actual physical element that does take up memory. In this 
ABM, the SoS manager agent is instantiated once; the System agent is instantiated multiple times (once for each 
system in the SoS); and the threat agent is instantiated once for each threat in the model.  
As the ABM is executed the threat(s) affect the systems and interfaces in the SoS and the SoS manager must 
respond by adapting and evolving the SoS architecture to mitigate the effects of the threat(s) on the SoS architecture. 
The ability of the evolved SoS architecture to compensate for the threat effects is a measure of the SoS architecture 
resiliency.  
4.2.1. SoS Manager Agent 
The SoS manager agent (SMA) represents the person or organization responsible for development of the SoS. The 
SoS manager agent creates and keeps track of the SoS architecture. The SMA starts with initial SoS architecture 
derived from the information from the DoDAF viewpoints which is input into the ABM. As in the previous papers1,2,
the SMA negotiates with each system to provide the capabilities mapped to that system per the SV-5b view. The SMA 
responds to the threat agent by evolving the SoS architecture and renegotiating with the constituent systems for another 
set of system capabilities that defend against the threats. Figure 5 shows the state diagram for the SMA.  
Resilience is modeled in the SMA as the SoS architecture is adapted to handle each threat. In the Evolve state, the 
SMA analyzes the consequence of the threat on the current SoS architecture and takes steps to reinitiate the SoS 
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development cycle. The next SoS development cycle take into account the effect of the emergent threat and plans for 
a new SoS architecture that still provides the SoS capabilities despite the threat.  
The threat agent can attack the SoS by knocking out a system or a system interface. When the SMA receives the 
message that the system or interface has been attacked the SMA responds by adapting and evolving the SoS 
architecture to account for the loss. This restarts the SoS-to-systems negotiation cycle to fill the capability gap with 
capabilities from the other constituent systems.  
Figure 2. CV-2 Capability Taxonomy for Example Autonomous Unmanned Vehicle 
Figure 3. SV-5b System to Capability Mapping 
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Figure 4. SV-1 Showing System Interfaces   
4.2.2. System Agent  
The system agent (SA) represents the system that is part of the SoS. The SA responds to the SMA request for 
capabilities by sending a message that identifies which capabilities the SA can support. The SA provides capabilities 
to the SoS manager based on its cooperation level. The system cooperation level is a representation of the system’s 
willingness and ability to provide the capabilities requested by the SMA. Individual systems have their own, schedules, 
priorities, and pressures that influence the system’s ability to deliver capabilities to the SoS manager. So the system 
cooperation level embodies not only the willingness of the system to cooperate but the ability of the system to 
cooperate. The SA state chart is shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 5. SoS Manager Agent State Chart 
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Figure 6. System Agent State Chart 
4.2.3. Threat Agent  
The threat agent (TA) is introduced into the model to represent the emerging threats that can attack a SoS. The 
threat can affect the SoS development in two ways: (1) destroy a system or (2) destroy an interface between systems. 
The TA first evaluates whether to take out a system or an interface. Then based on that decision determines which 
system or which interface to attack. The attack is a message to the SMA indicating which system or interface is being 
attacked. Figure 7 shows the threat agent state chart. 
Figure 7. Threat Agent State Chart 
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5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper presented an approach for modeling resilience in SoS architectures. The SoS architecture 
resilience model (SARM) incorporates the use of DoDAF viewpoints with the SoS development in an executable 
ABM. The SoS architecture represents the systems and interfaces that are part of the SoS and it evolves as new threats 
emerge. The SARM consists of a SMA, SA, and TA. The SMA is used to instantiate one SoS manager. The SA is 
used to instantiate multiple systems; one for each system in the SoS. The TA is used to instantiate multiple threats. 
The new SoS architecture can then be pushed back to the DoDAF architecture viewpoints that had the original 
capabilities, systems, and interfaces. If an architecture modeling tool is used, the output of the ABM is imported into 
the architecture modeling tool. Otherwise, it is a manual process to update the DoDAF architecture viewpoints from 
the ABM results.  
The benefit of the modeling approach presented in this paper is to view SoS architectures in regard to resiliency. 
Previously, resilience has been considered as a characteristic of a system but with no measurement. Recently, 
resilience has become more important with SoS but still unclear on how it could be measured. The SARM can be used 
to determine resilience capacity of a SoS using the SoS architecture and an agent-based model. Up to now there has 
not been method of comparing SoS architectures for resiliency. This paper provides a method for comparing SoS 
architectures in terms of resilience similar to the method of comparing metropolitan regions for resiliency13.
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